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Abstract 
In this paper we outline a cognitive theory and model of 
surprise judgements which aims to explain how and why 
some events are considered to be surprising in a piece of text , 
while others are not. The model is based on a series of 
experiments carried out by Grimes -Maguire and Keane 
(2005a), which show that subtle changes in the predictability 
of a discourse can have a profound effect on a reader’s 
perceived surprise at certain events. Rather than defining 
surprise in terms of expectation, we conceive of it as a 
process involving Representation-Fit. We have implemented 
this theory in a computational model that has two stages: the 
Integration stage entails building a coherent representation of 
the scenario by means of an objective knowledge base rooted 
in WordNet. The Analysis stage then outputs  a surprise rating 
for a specified event, based on the degree to which that  event 
can be supported by  the prior representation. Simulations 
reveal a strong correspondence between model and participant 
generated surprise ratings.  
Keywords: Surprise, cognitive modelling, representation. 
Introduction 
Although we have a remarkable ability to make sense of and 
even predict events in the world around us, sometimes this 
ability breaks down and we experience a feeling of surprise. 
Consider how you would react, for instance, if you heard a 
sudden loud bang while sitting in a quiet room, or how you 
might feel if you saw your next -door neighbour while on 
holiday in another country. It is well established that the 
perception of such surprising events will often initiate a 
number of complex cognitive processes, usually leading to 
an interruption of ongoing activities and an increased 
focusing of attention on the event in question (e.g. Ekman, 
1972; Fisk, 2002; Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl, 
1997). The main purpose of these actions is to try and 
understand why the surprising event occurred in the first 
place, so as to resolve any feelings of confusion.  
Despite our familiarity with the concept of surprise 
however, it is quite difficult to reach a satisfactory definition 
of this in the literature (see Maguire & Keane, 2006). 
Intuitively, we can relate surprise to expectation or 
probability, but complications arise here in that not every 
low probability event will be judged as equally surprising 
by an observer, and similarly there may be some high 
probability events that are nevertheless judged as surprising 
(e.g. Shackle, 1969; Teigen & Keren, 2003). While some 
research has recently identified a link between the subjective 
probability of a given event occurring and its surprise level 
(Fisk, 2002), other theorists claim that this phenomenon 
may be best defined in terms of expectations, or more 
specifically, disconfirmed expectations. For example, Meyer 
et al (1997) in their Cognitive-Psychoevolutionary Model, 
maintain  that surprise occurs when an event is seen to 
deviate significantly from an expected schema. In a similar 
vein, Teigen and Keren (2003) in their Contrast Hypothesis 
propose that a person’s level of surprise at a given event 
will be dependent on the degree of perceived disparity 
between that event and another more likely one. In other 
words, these theories hold  that while expectation is vital in 
the experience of surprise, genuine surprise results only 
when the event in question conflicts with another event that 
was more expected. The question for us is whether this 
mechanism is truly the best predictor of surprise, or if there 
might be something other than expectation at work. 
In this paper, we shall address these issues and in doing so 
will propose a novel cognitive theory and model of surprise 
judgements. In short, this theory suggests  that surprise is not 
dependent on expectation, but rather on the characteristics 
of a person’s scenario representation. Before detailing the 
implementation of this model however, we will first outline 
some empirical work which led to its development. 
Predictability, expectation and surprise 
While the above research implies that the relationship 
between expectation and surprise is  not quite as clear-cut as 
initially thought, few studies have examined the connection 
between these two variables in discourse comprehension. 
For this reason, Grimes-Maguire and Keane (2005a) carried 
out a number of experiments to ascertain whether perceived 
surprise at a given event in a discourse would be related to 
the degree to which that event was expected, as measured 
by forward inferences. Forward inferences operate by 
connecting the events in a text  with background knowledge 
so that  the reader can form an expectation about an 
upcoming event (e.g., if you read the sentence “He threw 
the delicate porcelain vase against the wall”, you will 
probably infer that “the vase broke”). Inferred events will 
be read quicker, thereby offering a more objective means of 
quantifying expectation (Klin, Murray, Levine & Guzmán, 
1999). In Grimes-Maguire and Keane’s (2005a) study, 
participants were required to read a number of short 
scenarios, such as that in Table 1, and asked to indicate how 
surprising they found the concluding sentence. The degree 
of information given to the participants about this critical 
sentence was varied in three distinct versions of the 
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 scenarios: in short, the predictable version described an 
explicit enabling event for the final sentence, the neutral 
version merely hinted at this enabling event by containing 
vaguely supportive information for it, while the 
unpredictable  version described an event that was irrelevant 
to the final sentence.  
 
Table 1: Sample scenario from Grimes-Maguire & Keane, 
(2005a, Experiment 1) 
 
John was drinking coffee in the sitting room.   
The cup  balanced on the armchair (Predictable). 
He put the cup of coffee down (Neutral). 
He started to read the paper (Unpredictable). 
He wasn’t feeling very well.   
Suddenly he sneezed.   
**The coffee spilt all over the carpet.** 
 
Table 2: Results from Grimes -Maguire & Keane (2005a)  
 
 Surprise rating Reading time (ms) 
Condition Mean SD Mean SD 
Predictable 2.81 1.67 3106 1610 
Neutral 3.82 1.84 3498 1839 
Unpredictable 4.44 1.82 3445 1608 
 
The results of this experiment are displayed in Table 2. We 
discovered that participants were easily able to distinguish 
between the separate levels of predictability across the three 
scenario versions, in so far as they gave qualitatively 
different surprise ratings for each. However, we also found 
that participants only formed an on-line expectation in the 
predictable condition, as indicated by faster reading times 
of the final sentence relative to the other two conditions. 
This  suggests that expectations could only be made about 
an upcoming event when the preceding discourse was 
highly suggestive of it; a finding in line with other studies 
on forward inferences (e.g. Klin et al, 1999). These results 
argue against the claim that surprise is directly related to 
expectation, because if these two concepts  were linearly 
related, participants would have registered low surprise in 
the predictable condition (when an expectation was 
formed), but an equally high level of surprise in the other 
two conditions (where no expectation was formed). While 
the former was found to be true, the latter was not. To 
explain these findings, we conceptualise surprise in terms of 
Representation-Fit – a theory outlined in more detail below.  
Theory of representation-fit 
Most researchers in  discourse comprehension agree that, in 
order to fully understand a piece of text, the reader must 
construct a number of complex levels of representation (e.g. 
Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 1994; van Dijk & Kintsch, 
1983). While the more basic of these levels involves 
grasping the individual meanings of the constituent words 
and their grouping or syntax, the most sophisticated level 
entails building a situation model of the events in question. 
When a reader creates a situation model, it is almost as if 
they are a direct observer of the depicted events: they can 
make inferences about the central characters, their goals and 
actions, as well as forming a mental picture of the time and 
location in which the story is set (Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998). In the majority of discourses , it is relatively easy for 
a reader to build such a situation model, mainly because 
they will be motivated to achieve a sense of coherence 
among the component events  by relating every new event to 
what has gone before. Graesser et al (1994) note that, in 
doing this, not only is it essential to attain local coherence 
by linking neighbouring events together, (e.g., anaphoric 
reference - knowing that in the sentences “John was 
drinking coffee in the sitting room. He put the cup down”, 
HE in the second sentence refers to JOHN in the first), it is 
also important to accomplish global coherence, by 
integrating all the events in the text together to make sense 
of the story. If events can be linked effortlessly and without 
ambiguity, then the story can be said to be coherent, 
allowing the reader to build an accurate representation, or 
situation model, of the events .  
In their Plausibility Analysis Model, Connell and Ke ane 
(2006) established that coherence is vital in determining the 
plausibility of short event descriptions. Namely, they found 
that the easier it is to make an inference between two events 
in a text , the more plausible those events will appear. Given 
the strong link between surprise and plausibility (Black, 
Freeman & Johnson-Laird, 1986), it follows that coherence 
must also play a key role in this phenomenon More 
specifically, it seems reasonable to suppose that an event 
which cannot be coherently linked with one’s  scenario 
representation will be judged as surprising, whereas an 
event that can be coherently linked will result in little or no 
surprise. This is the central premise of our theory of 
Representation-Fit (Grimes-Maguire & Keane, 2005b). In 
short, this theory conceives a judgment of surprise for a 
given event in a scenario as an attempt to ‘fit’ that event 
with the prior discourse representation in the same way as 
one might attempt to position a piece into a jigsaw puzzle.  
The main way in which this account differs from previous 
theories of surprise is that it does not view expectation as a 
vital determinant of this experience (e.g. Meyer et al, 1997). 
Instead, we see the assessment of surprise as consisting of 
two distinct stages. Firstly, the Integration stage  involves 
linking each new event with those that have gone before so 
as to achieve an up-to-date coherent representation of the 
scenario . Secondly, the Analysis stage  involves a systematic 
assessment of this representation, whereby the reader is 
required to rate their surprise for a given event. As well as 
detecting factors  that are directly supportive of this event, 
we propose that readers are also able to identify vaguely 
supportive information for it. This would explain why 
surprise ratings differed markedly between the three 
conditions in the experiment of Grimes-Maguire and Keane 
(2005a). In the remaining sections we will detail how these 
distinct stages have been implemented computationally, 
using the scenario in Table 1 as an example. 
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Computational Implementation of Model 
Based on the theory of representation-fit, we have created a 
computational model of surprise which takes as input short 
scenarios such as that in Table 1, and outputs a surprise 
rating for the final sentence. This is achieved by a number 
of different components, the most fundamental of which is 
the knowledge base (KB). While many computational 
models in discourse comprehension employ hand-crafted 
knowledge bases, we have chosen to use WordNet as a 
foundation for ours (cf. Miller, 1995). WordNet is a 
semantic lexicon for the English language, and can 
therefore provide a more objective means for representing 
the information necessary to understand the experimental 
scenarios. The KB comprises the definitions (or glosses) of 
the component words1, the hierarchical relationships 
between these words, and the acceptable arguments for any 
verbs or actions which are used in the scenarios. This 
information was extracted in propositional format from the 
Prolog implementation of WordNet. The KB also contains 
some key attributes of the concepts relevant to the scenarios 
which are not present in WordNet. Such knowledge was 
incorporated into the KB in a blind fashion and only a small 
percentage of the propositions are of this nature.  
 
Integration Stage                  Analysis Stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implicit  
Representation 
 
 
Figure 1: Processes involved in the model of surprise 
 
The two chief components involved in the representation of 
events are: (1) searching for coherence among the text  
constituents, and (2) building/updating the representation of 
the scenario. These are governed by different aspects of the 
model, and roughly correspond to van Dijk and Kintsch’s 
(1983) distinction between the textbase and the situation 
model of comprehension .  The component necessary for 
generating the surprise rating involves detecting the degree 
of representational support for the critical event by means 
                                                               
1 It should be noted that in WordNet, there are a number of senses 
for each word. For example, ‘coffee’ can be defined as a beverage, 
a plant, a seed or a colour. We only included the relevant senses 
for the component words in the KB (e.g. in Table 1, coffee is a 
beverage). However, possible expansions of the model might 
automatically select the correct sense based on the story context . 
of a retrospective judgement. Figure 1 illustrates how these 
components are implemented in the two different stages.  
Integration stage 
In the Integration stage, the program takes as  input a 
scenario , sentence-by-sentence (in propositional format), in 
the same way a reader would. Each sentence must first be 
deemed coherent, based on background knowledge, before 
it can be integrated into the representation. For example, the 
opening sentence in Table 1, “John was drinking coffee in 
the sitting room”, is  considered coherent because the verb 
to drink is correctly paired with an animate object (John) 
and a liquid (coffee). This rule is adapted from the 
definition of the appropriate sense of ‘drink’ in WordNet 
(i.e., “to take in liquids”). Since actions like drinking can 
happen in locations (i.e. sitting room), the model can 
classify this sentence as coherent and proceed to build a 
representation of the depicted events. This is achieved by 
using the available dimensions of the Event -Indexing Model 
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998): (1) protagonists and objects, 
(2) causality, (3) intentionally, (4) temporality, and (5) 
spatiality. Hence, the representation here consists of a 
protagonist ‘John’, engaged in an action (intentionality) of 
‘drinking’, the object of this action is ‘coffee’, and the 
location is the ‘sitting room’.  
An important consideration for the Integration stage is the 
information that is kept in focus in the representation 
throughout comprehension. The Landscape Model (van den 
Broek, Young, Tzeng & Linderholm, 1999) hypothesises 
that during reading, constraints on working memory mean 
that concepts are constantly fluctuating in activation levels. 
Autonomous activation, as well as higher-level processes 
involved in searching for links among concepts  and events , 
in turn creates a diverse ‘landscape’ of activation. This 
phenomenon will obviously affect the ease with which 
incoming events are integrated into the representation. 
While at present our model does not take into account these 
complex activation processes, it does recognise three 
distinct types of representation: the current representation 
(events in the currently processed sentence), the past 
representation (events that have previously occurred) and 
the implicit representation (knowledge that is strongly 
associated with the concepts mentioned in the scenario , as 
governed by the KB). For example, after reading the first 
sentence in Table 1, the implicit representation might 
contain the fact that “coffee is often contained in a cup”, 
and that “a sitting room is a room in a house where people 
can relax”. This information, while not in focus at the time 
of comprehension, may be called upon later if required 
when attempting to integrate future events. 
Once the initial representation has been constructed from 
the events in the first sentence, the model can now process 
the next. As before, this sentence must be checked for 
coherence in the KB, but in addition to making sense in 
isolation, the events in this sentence must also be shown to 
make sense in context. To do this, the model attempts to 
link all the concepts in the current sentence with those that 
Search for Coherence  
Build/Update Representation 
Search for 
supportive 
information 
Make 
Surprise 
Rating 
Read sentence 
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 have previously been mentioned, using information in the 
current, past and implicit representations. For example, in 
the second sentence of the predictable condition in Table 1, 
“The cup balanced on the armchair”, the model can link 
cup with coffee in the previous sentence, as the definition 
(or gloss) of cup includes the fact that it can be used to 
contain a beverage. This also makes use of the hierarchical 
structure of the concepts in WordNet (i.e., the model must 
know that ‘coffee’ is a beverage in order to relate it to 
‘cup’). Such a linking mechanism can be said to constitute a 
backward inference, or a causal-bridging inference, and is 
extremely prevalent in reading (Graesser et al, 1994). 
Following this , the model creates an incoherency score 
for the sentence in question. This is simply calculated by 
dividing the number of concepts that have not been 
successfully linked with the total number of concepts in the 
sentence. Based on this, if the second sentence is  deemed 
sufficiently coherent, the model updates the representation 
by integrating the new event(s) in. These events will now be 
currently in focus, but prior events will still be present in 
the representation (e.g., in this case, the knowledge that 
John is the protagonist and that the location is the sitting 
room). Subsequent sentences in the scenario are processed 
in the same way, in so far as they are verified in the KB, 
checked for coherent links with the past representation and 
incorporated into the current representation. 
At the end of the Integration stage, the model will have a 
total incoherency score for the scenario, which corresponds 
to the overall ratio of unlinked concepts to linked concepts. 
Conceptually this refers to the amount of ‘new’ information 
that could not be inferred by the story context. This will in 
turn be relevant when making the surprise rating for the 
critical event, which is governed by the Analysis stage. 
Analysis stage 
In the Analysis stage, the model outputs a judgement of 
surprise for the final sentence in the scenario. In a nutshell, 
it ascertains how well the events in this sentence can be 
supported by the prior discourse. To accomplish this , the 
model employs similar linking mechanisms to those in the 
Integration stage; however it is conceived of as a more 
effortful search to detect any supportive information for the 
constituent concepts. There are two main types of link 
involved here. The first are direct links (D): these occur 
when a concept in the final sentence has previously been 
mentioned in the discourse. If this is the case, the concept is 
present in the prior representation, and thus should be very 
easy to re-integrate (van den Broek et al., 1999). For 
example, in the final sentence of Table 1, “The coffee spilt 
all over the carpet”, coffee has already been mentioned in 
the first sentence so should be very unsurprising. A direct 
link like this is assigned the highest score of 1. The second 
type of link is  termed an indirect link (I). Although a certain 
concept may not have been mentioned before, it could have 
been implied by the prior discourse, or could be easily 
inferred based on background knowledge. Here the contents 
of the implicit representation may come into play. For 
example, in the above sentence, carpet can be indirectly 
linked to sitting room in the first sentence as sitting rooms 
often contain carpets. An indirect link is  arbitrarily set as 
half that of a direct link in order to reflect its diminished 
importance. However we have also varied the relative 
contributions of the weights of this  value, as will be seen in 
the Simulation section.  
As Figure 2 illustrates, the surprise rating is calculated by 
dividing the sum of the linked concepts (D + [I*0.5]) with 
the number of concepts in the final sentence (W), and 
getting the inverse of this score. This is then added to the 
total incoherency score (IC) as obtained in the Integration 
stage, so as to take into account how well the entire 
representation fits together when making the surprise rating 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Surprise rating formula. 
 
This formula allows  the model to detect subtle differences 
in surprise level across the experimental scenarios. For 
example, the predictable version from Table 1 would be 
judged as very unsurprising because all the concepts in the 
final sentence can be easily inferred from the preceding 
discourse. In the neutral and unpredictable versions, the key 
concept of ‘spill’ cannot be causally inferred making these 
versions  appear more surprising than the predictable one. 
However, because there is a greater overall coherency in the 
neutral scenario (as governed by the total incoherency 
score), this will be perceived as slightly less surprising than 
the unpredictable scenario.  
Model Simulation and Evaluation 
The performance of the model was tested against that of the 
participants from the first experiment carried out by 
Grimes-Maguire and Keane (2005a). For this purpose, we 
carried out simulations on a number of the scenarios read 
by participants in this  experiment. We then analysed the 
individual contributions of the different variables required 
to make the surprise rating by means of a sensitivity 
analysis. Though based on a relatively small set of data, the 
model is designed to be generalisable to different types of 
texts so as to assess surprise for a wide variety of events.  
Method 
Materials  Nine of the 18 scenarios used in Grimes-Maguire 
and Keane (2005a; exp. 1) were used in the simulation. 
Each of these was five sentences long and had three 
different conditions of predictable, neutral and unpredictable 
(as in Table 1). All 27 scenarios were translated into 
propositional format for the purposes of the experiment. 
 
Procedure The model took as input each scenario sentence-
by-sentence and then outputted a surprise rating using the 
formula in Figure 2. These scores were then standardised 
and translated into a number between 1 and 7 (with 1 
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 referring to low surprise and 7 referring to a high level of 
surprise), to allow for direct comparison with the participant 
generated scores of Grimes-Maguire and Keane (2005a). 
Results & Discussion 
In sum, the results of the simulations corresponded strongly 
with the surprise ratings given by participants. There was a 
good correlation between the model’s scores and the 
experimental data for the same materials (Pearson’s r = 0.8, 
p<0.001, N = 27). A scatterplot illustrating this correlation 
can be seen in Figure 3. A regression analysis subsequently 
confirmed that the model could be used to predict people’s 
surprise ratings for the scenarios (r2 = 0.64, p <0.001).  
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We wished to see how the model would perform in relation 
to the three conditions of predictable, neutral and 
unpredictable. Accordingly, we performed a one-way 
ANOVA, repeated measures, which revealed a significant 
effect of condition, F(2,24) = 7.073, p < 0.001, MSe = 
1.075. As expected, the model rated the predictable 
scenarios as the least surprising (M = 2.685, SD = .915), 
followe d by the neutral (M  = 3.826, SD =  1.143) and 
unpredictable scenarios (M = 4.503, SD = 1.039). All these 
conditions differed significantly using Bonferroni 
adjustments (all ps < 0.001). This compares favourably to 
the experimental results (see earlier Table 1) and suggests 
that the model was able to detect the varying levels of 
support  or enabling events  for the final sentence , as 
afforded by the different scenario versions.   
 
Assessing contribution of key parameters As Figure 2 
illustrates, we had assigned certain values to the parameters 
required for making the surprise rating a priori: namely, 
any direct links were assigned a value of 1 (100%) and 
indirect links a value of 0.5 (50%). We also attached a 
weighting to the total incoherency score (100%). However, 
we wished to investigate the varying contributions of each 
of these parameters, and so consequently performed a 
sensitivity analysis on the data. Many researchers (e.g. 
Connell & Keane, 2006) have shown that this is an effective 
technique for assessing the robustness of a model.   
 Firstly, we carried out a multiple regression analysis to 
determine the relative contribution of each variable to the 
power of the model. Thus, total incoherency (IC), direct 
(D), and indirect (I) links were used as predictor variables, 
with the surprise rating as the criterion variable. The 
standardised regression weights from this analysis were 
.826 (total incoherency), -.305 (direct links), and -.285 
(indirect links), all ps <0.0001. This illustrates that  all three 
variables contribute to the predictive accuracy of the model. 
We also performed correlations between each of these 
variables . As can be seen from Table 3, surprise is highly 
correlated with total incoherency, which suggests that the 
Integration stage is very important in determining the 
surprise rating. Indirect links are also strongly correlated, 
however direct links do not have a significant relationship 
with surprise level.  This is probably due to the fact that 
there was little difference in the number of direct links 
across the three conditions in the scenarios employed. 
 
Table 3: Correlations between variables used in the model 
 
 Total IC Direct Indirect 
Surprise .930** -.105 -.632**  
Total IC  .147 -.523**  
Direct    -.276 
 
Next we systematically varied the weights of these 
contributing variables to ascertain the robustness of the 
model. As only a weak correlation between direct links and 
surprise rating was observed, we chose to focus this 
analysis on the other two measures. Table 4 displays the 
resulting correlations when varying the total incoherency 
score (0-100%) and the indirect links (0-100%). As can be 
seen, when neither indirect links nor the incoherency of the 
scenario are taken into account, the correlations are not 
reliable, while increasing the weight attached to both these 
variables augments the significance. Using the original two 
variables of indirect (50%) and direct links (100%), we can 
see that the model performs best when total incoherency 
score is weighted at 50%. This might suggest that in our 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for variables total incoherency score and indirect links (direct links held at 100%) 
Indirect Links 
 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
0% 0.2637 0.3974 0.5229 0.6235 0.6918 0.7311 0.7497 0.7554 0.7538 0.7485 0.7413 
25% 0.5603 0.6586 0.7322 0.7798 0.8058 0.8164 0.8171 0.8121 0.8040 0.7944 0.7843 
50% 0.6922 0.7471 0.7853 0.8089 0.8213 0.8257 0.8246 0.8201 0.8135 0.8057 0.7974 
75% 0.7317 0.7645 0.7875 0.8025 0.8110 0.8147 0.8148 0.8125 0.8084 0.8033 0.7974 
100% 0.7398 0.7619 0.7781 0.7893 0.7964 0.8003 0.8016 0.8010 0.7990 0.7960 0.7922 
  T
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Figure 3: Scatterplot illustrating correlation between 
model and participant generated surprise ratings 
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 original formula we may have been attaching too much 
significance to this factor, however such a minor shift in 
correlations does not appreciably affect the power of the 
model. Also, it would be inappropriate to over-fit this 
model based on such a small sample. 
General Discussion 
In this paper we have presented a novel theory and model of 
surprise judgements which holds that a person’s level of 
surprise at a given event is based on how well that event can 
be integrated into their discourse representation. The 
computational implementation of this  model has yielded 
promising results, in that the surprise ratings generated for a 
number of short scenarios closely mirror participant 
responses. We have also demonstrated that the principle 
variables involved in both the Integration and the Analysis 
stages are important in the assessment of surprise.   
Many existing theories of surprise define it in terms of 
expectancy-disconfirmation, or schema discrepancy (e.g. 
Meyer et al, 1997; Teigen & Keren, 2003). However, the 
present work has revealed that the theory of Representation-
Fit can offer a more comprehensive account of surprise. 
The implementation of this  theory explains the ability that 
people have to distinguish different levels of predictability 
in discourse scenarios; it suggests that they can search for 
and detect the strength of enabling factors for any given 
event in a depicted situation. Consequently, surprise does 
not only occur following unexpected events , rather it is a 
more complex assessment involving both automatic and 
strategic processes. It is important to note however that we 
do not suggest expectation is not involved in surprise at all, 
rather we propose this  is not the only factor in the 
phenomenon. Recent empirical work by Maguire and 
Keane (2006) lends additional support  to this claim, 
illustrating that, even when events go against expectations, 
surprise can be lowered if participants have a means of 
integrating the unexpected event into their representation.  
Clearly, there are a number of possible extensions for this 
model. One option, for instance, would be to further 
acknowledge the fluctuating levels of activation among the 
constituent concepts (as in the Landscape Model, van den 
Broek et al, 1999), and place more emphasis on constraints 
such as working memory and attentional capacity. 
However, while this model involves processes important to 
reading, it is not intended to offer a detailed account of 
discourse comprehension. Instead it is designed to be 
generalisable to a number of areas relating to surprise. The 
model might be used, for example, to explain incidences of 
surprise in everyday life, or how people use surprise to 
reason about the likelihood of future events. 
In conclusion, this work has shown that surprise is 
strongly governed by how well events can be integrated into 
the reader’s representation. These initial simulations are 
promising, and open a lot of areas for future research. As 
well as shedding light on the phenomenon of surprise, the 
results illustrate the complex nature of event representation 
and discourse comprehension. 
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